Nan Rich will do best in the Panhandle on Primary night (but not because they like her)

Note:  This post has been updated at the bottom to discuss the August 26th results


August 26th marks the end of the Democratic Primary for Governor in Florida.  The race pitted Charlie Crist, the former Republican Governor and establishment favorite for the nomination, against Nan Rich, a liberal former state senator from Broward County.  Rich spent the majority of her campaign attacking Crist for his days as a Republican (a moderate Republican to be clear).  However, her campaign never gained traction. Contrary to claims of momentum, Rich has consistently stayed under 20% in the polls while Crist remained in the high 60s.  Rich suffered from a lack of money, lack of name recognition, and a lack of a firebrand style that could galvanize grassroots supports.  The race had potential to be competitive on paper, but the reality of the campaigns ensures Crist will win big on primary night.

The only real question comes down to the margin.  Most expect a significant, 30+ point margin or more.  Republicans are trying to mess with the narrative by insisting Crist should win 80-20 (which is unlikely).  To be sure, Crist will win big.  I personally expect him to come in around 70% to 75% of the vote.

It is entirely possible Crist will win every county in the state.  Rich is likely to do well in Broward County, the largest Democratic county in the state, due to her roots there.  However, a Broward  lose with around 45% is a likely outcome.  Outside of Broward or Palm Beach, there aren’t many apparent geographic bases of support for Rich.  However, I am willing to wager that there is one region this very liberal, Jewish State Senator from Southeast Florida will do well; the Florida panhandle.

The Panhandle’s Odd Voting History

The Panhandle of Florida, a bastion of conservative Democrats and deep red voting patterns, offers Rich a base of voters.  Don’t believe me?  Lets take a look at two recent primary elections to prove my point..

The first is the Democratic Primary for Governor in 2010.  Democrat Alex Sink, the CFO of Florida, easily beat Brian Moore in the primary.  Moore was unknown to most voters. However, he had a unique distinction, he was the Socialist Party’s candidate for President in 2008.  Moore was indeed a socialist, not that many knew it due to his invisible campaign.  However, his strongest support came from rural north Florida.


In 2012, Senator Bill Nelson had a weak primary challenger from Glenn Burkett.  Burkett was a business owner, advocate of healthy eating and supplements, and was somewhat on the left of the spectrum (and also pretty crazy).  Burkett had no real campaign presence, similar to Moore.

2012 Burkett

You see similar patterns in the two maps.  These two largely-anonymous challengers to the establishment did best in conservative regions of the state despite being to the left of their opponents.

The two maps below show the 2012 Senate General Election and 2010 Governor General Election.  As the maps show, many of these counties stronger for Moore and Burkett voted Republican.

2012 Senate

2010 Gov

It is important to note that many of these red counties, the same one’s that gave Moore and Burkett strong showings, are also Democratic in terms of registration, often by large margins.  These are the lands of southern and rural democrats who vote blue locally but often vote red further up the ballot.  The map is from registration figures at the end of 2012.


The regions where Moore and Burkett did best were the same.  Their strongest counties were the conservative panhandle and regions of rural south-central Florida.  These counties largely vote Republican, often overwhelmingly so.

To examine these counties further, I selected the counties that gave both Moore and Burkett 30% of the vote or more in their respective primaries.

Over 30 Counties

Most of the counties were Democratic in registration, for further analysis, I focused only on those the Democratic counties (all of which had significantly higher percentages than Republicans).  These counties can ONLY vote Republican thanks to Democrats voting for Republican candidates.  The maps below show the registration figures for those counties (from 2012) and the Senate and Governor results.

Dem Counties Reg Dem Counties Nelson Dem Counties Sink

As the three maps show, the counties are strongly Democratic by registration but lean Republican or are heavily Republican.  Nelson kept margins closer in parts of the panhandle thanks to his stronger level of support with rural voters, however, he still lost most of those counties.

Why are Conservative Democrats voting for Liberals?

These counties may be ancestral Democratic, but they don’t always vote that way further up on the ballot.  So why did they vote for liberal candidates like Moore or Burkett?  There are a a few factors that come into play

First, these Democrats are coming out to vote for local primaries and are not as interested in their Senate or Governor primaries; especially if they are unsure they will back the nominee in November. Turnout in these counties is often higher than statewide average.  However, it is not the top of the ticket bringing these people out to vote, it’s their local primaries.   Sure enough, in these counties (those of which had closed local democratic primaries on the ballot at the same time), the local races had more votes cast than the Governor or Senate primaries.  The maps below show the turnout gap between the Senate/Gov primaries and a local democratic primary on the same ballot.

2012 Sen Gap

2012 Sen Gap2

In all counties examined, those with a closed democratic local primary saw higher turnout than the top of the ballot.  Now, one might excuse the turnout gap for the Governor primary.  After all, Alex Sink had just begun running TV and was still not well known by a 1/3 of Democrats by the time of the primary (according to PPP).  There simply may have been a lack of interest in the race at the time.  Indeed, bluer counties like Alachua and Gadsden saw similar instances were local primaries performed better than the gubernatorial primary.  However, this doesn’t explain the 2012 Senate Primary.  Nelson is much more well known in Florida, serving as Senator since 2000.  Yet in 2012, the turnout gap favoring local races remained.  Indeed, while Alachua (home of college town Gainesville) saw the 2010 Gov race underperform in turnout compared to a local primary, in 2012 the US Senate primary performed better.  In other blue counties across the state the US Senate primary was the top turnout race on the ballot, but not in the rural counties examined here.

This turnout issue feeds into the second factor for why the votes for Moore and Burkett was so high.  The second reason likely comes down to a protest vote.  Many of these ancestral Democratic counties have long since left their party with the exception of local elections.  These Democrats come out to vote for the local races in August and see a primary for a race they have a strong chance of voting Republican for in November.  In instances were they recognize the Democratic front-runner (Sink and Nelson) they voted against them to register their displeasure, not knowing the person they voted for was more liberal.  To many voters in those counties, Moore and Burkett didn’t represent liberal beliefs, they represented a chance to buck the establishment choices.  Their platforms of beliefs were unknown, they were simply names on a ballot, which allowed them to be used as protest votes.  In fact, the similarity between the Moore and Burkett results is pretty striking.  In more than half the counties, the difference between the two candidate’s percentages was less than 5%.  Moore and Burkett’s county results also showed strong correlation between each other, especially considering they were on ballots in different years for difference races.

Moore Burkett PRimary

For several of these counties, voting for Nan Rich over Charlie Crist will be a way to smack Charlie in the face.  Rich may have attention in the blogs and with activists, however, polling shows her with little name-recognition statewide.  Many of her liberal positions are unknown.  Too many voters, she will just be a name on a ballot, similar to Moore and Burkett.

It is a real possibility that the same factors that drove up support for Burkett and Moore will aid Rich.  Rich has a more visible campaign to be sure, but polls still show upwards of 70% of voters don’t know anything about her. This information gap can allow her to do well among rural Democrats who are coming out to vote for their local races.  Many of these rural Democrats voted for Crist in 2006 as a Republican. Crist could hold support with these voters thanks to his old ties, or his party switch could anger these conservative democrats.  Crist’s situation is a little unique.  However, I still expect many of these conservative Democrats to cast a ballot for Rich to register long-held displeasure with their political party.

Lets say Nan Rich does well in the panhandle.  Does this mean all those counties that do well for her are out of Crist’s reach in November?  That the Democrats have registered their displeasure with Crist?  The answer is… it depends on the county.

Primary Voting Compared to November?

Overall, the strength of these weak primary challengers does have a relationship to the strength of the establishment Democrat in November.  In both instances, the counties that were strongest for the primary challengers were weak for the nominee in the fall; while the counties strongest for the establishment candidate (often urban blue counties) were strongest for team blue in the fall.  The scatter-plots for each race show, as support for the primary challenger went down, the support for Dems in November got stronger.

Nelson Burkett Scatter Moore Sink Scatter

While their is a relationship between the primary performance and November General, their are important caveats.  The relationship exists but it is weak.  In addition, several counties that went strong for Burkett and Moore were narrow loses for the Democrats in the fall instead of complete blowouts.  In addition, Liberty and Franklin counties both voted for Sink and Nelson after giving strong margins to the primary challengers (with Hendry and Hamilton also voting for Nelson).  A weak primary showing against a no-name challenger is not a guaranteed predictor of trouble.  However, it does signal trouble.  A weak primary showing for Crist in any of these ancestral  Democratic counties would signify a fight for the general election.


Nan Rich’s fight for a more liberal Democratic nominee for Governor comes to an end on August 26th.  Unfortunately for her, the campaign just never got off the ground in the way it needed to be viable statewide.  While Rich fought for a liberal vision, it will be the conservative rural democrats that provide her with a significant block of votes outside the southeast   Crist’s time as a Republican could shake this theory up.  Perhaps some of these conservative Democrats will stick with him in the primary.  On the other hand, they could view Crist “just another Democrat” and cast a ballot for Rich to protest their party again.  While the unique nature of this race could lead to surprises, I expect to see a decent showing for Rich in the panhandle on primary night.

Election Night Update

Well the primary results are in, and Charlie Crist beat Nan Rich 74% to 26%.  Crist even won 75% of the vote in Broward County, Rich’s home base.  Crist dominated the urban Democratic areas, and as predicted, did worst in the rural conservative regions.  In fact, Crist lost two of these conservative counties; Holmes and Putnam.

2014 Crist

So lets compared Rich’s performance to that of Burkett and Moore.  The three maps below are each using the same color scheme.


2012 Burkett 2010Moore2

The three maps show that from 2010 to 2012, the issue of conservative counties bucking the establishment has grown.  Is this part of a larger trend?  Its hard to say for sure.  But there is a noticable increase in these counties giving over 30% to the no-name challenger despite statewide margins barely fluctuating.

Finally, looking at the relationship between Rich’s % in the primary and those of Burkett and Moore shows a significant correlation between all three candidates’ percentages.  Rich has the strongest correlation with Burkett.


So the prediction that Rich would do best in the panhandle came true.  What does this mean for the general election of 2014?  Well, it shows Crist’s time as a Republican is not automatically giving him stronger support among the southern democrats of North Florida. They still voted for the no-name challenger to show their displeasure.  Crist can still do what Nelson and Sink did, winning counties that gave strong margins to their primary challengers.  However, the fight for North Florida and rural Democrats will not be an easy one.  However, Crist’s pathway for November is still clear.

Florida Congressional Redistricting: Potential Map in Light of Court Ruling

Several articles on my website have dealt with Florida’s redistricting process.  I have highlighted the new maps the legislature approved last year, and offered my own version of what a better congressional map would look like.  Florida, unlike many other states, was not able to get away with overtly gerrymandering their lines thanks to the Fair Districts Amerndments that were based in 2010.  These amendments, one for the state legislative boundaries and one for the congressional boundaries, mandated that district lines, while accounting for minority populations, be compact and have no political motivation.  The amendments passed overwhelmingly.

2010 Fair Districts

After the passage of the new districts, which were certainly more compact than previous lines, there were still many issues.  Ridiculously drawn districts that packed in minority voters remained, as did other questionable appendages to districts.  While the maps were much improved from the last decade, they still had issues.  Soon enough, a lawsuit was filed over the congressional boundaries.


The details of the lawsuit are well document, so I will not re-hash them here.   The short and sweet is that the plaintiffs argued the Republican-legislature drew districts with clear partisan intend with the aid of political consultants.  Smoking guns included the deletion of emails between staff and consultants, and the fact that the congressional map was based off a map submitted by college student, who subsequently admitted at the trial that he had not drawn the map (and was therefor just a front person for the map).  Everything pointed to the notion that the legislature colluded with republican consultants to draw the maps, and went through channels to communicate.

The ruling followed a few weeks later, the legislature had violated the Fair District Amendments.  The judge berated the legislature, and specifically threw out two districts; 5 and 10.  The judge ordered these districts be redrawn.  The redrawing of these districts would also result in several neighboring districts being redrawn as well.

Lets look at each of these two districts.  First lets look at district 5.

District 5

District 5, or some variation of it, has been around since the early 1990s.  It was originally drawn by the courts to create a district that would elect an African-American.  It has subsequently been altered but kept by the Republican legislature, who saw a strong benefit in packing black voters from Jacksonville to Orlando.  The districts snakes down the state, hitting Jacksonville, Gainesville, and Orlando.  In addition, it grabs pockets of African-Americans in Putnam and Seminole counties.  The district is 52% African-American and heavily Democratic.  The district has always stood as a testament to racial gerrymandering.  In the guise of protecting minority voters, it packs them in and “bleaches” the other districts, making them more Republican.  The judge threw this district out.  In addition, during his opinion, the judge made a point to express that the VRA does not require a district that snakes from Jacksonville to Orlando.  The VRA mandates minority-majority districts when the minority community is compact, as the judge points out, and the Jacksonville to Orlando district is not recognized as compact.  How far this ruling will be taken regarding district 5 remains to be seen.  But I feel it means it cannot go down to Orlando.

The second district to get thrown out was District 10, seen below.

District 10This district is a fairly swingish one but leans Republican.  It gave Obama 45.7% of the vote, and had a very competitive congressional race in 2012 where Democrat Val Demings nearly knocked off Republican Incumbent Daniel Webster.  The district is fairly compact, but the judge threw the district out thanks to its appendage in the center-east of the district.  The hook into Orlando goes around the African-Americans currently in the 5th district, and avoids the Hispanics in the 9th.  The judge ruled this was about helping make Webster safer, not about keep all minority voters in districts 5 and 9.

The order to redraw both 5 and 9 has major implications for the congressional map.  District 5 touches so much of the state that any redraw of it effects every district in the area.  If the legislature is forced to redraw the districts, assuming an appeal fails, the map below shows which districts are likely to be effected.  I am assuming the legislature will try to contain the changes as much as possible.

Judge Decision

There are many variables, and infinite possibilities for what shifts could happen  The Republicans will try and protect their people, however they will have a microscope on them and will know their actions will be closely watched.  I drew up what an alternative map may look like.  However, I stress that there are many possibilities.  The map below shows the new districts for the region.  Any areas in grey are districts that were not changed.

Potential New Districts

Lets go through each district changed

District 5 (Yellow) — The district can no longer be African-American majority since it can no longer go down to Orlando.   I would prefer a district confined to Duval (my ideal map, posted on the site way back, has a district just in Duval), but one common talking point is a district that goes into Gainesville and gets as many African-Americans in the area it can.  The district takes in the African-American community in Jacksoville, Gainesville, parts of Putnam, and St Augustine.  It takes in additional suburban precincts to get enough population.  All of Gainesville is put in the district, taking votes away from district 3.  It is around 32% Voting Age Population African-American.  A democratic primary would be closer to 40% or 45% African-American, and the Democratic nominee would be favored in this 60% Obama district.  This district is perfectly capable of election an African-American democrat.  Representative Brown doesn’t want any changes to her district, so I doubt she will be happy.  The district still looks ridiculous, but no worth than district 20, which was upheld in South Florida.

District 4 (Green) — This district remains heavily Republican.  It loses some votes from Duval thanks to district 5, and makes up for it by going down into super-Republican St. Johns county.  Safe R.  Representative Crenshaw shouldn’t mind the shifts.

District 3 (Purple) — The heavily rural and Republican district loses the western half of Gainesville, but I make up the population by giving it more of Ocala in the south and some rural precincts.  The districts changes could give former Congressman Cliff Sterns an incentive to challenge Congressman Yoho in the primary in 2016 (he was from Ocala).  Either way the district stays Republican.

District 6 (blue) — This coastal district becomes more Democratic friendly thanks to two key changes.  It loses most of St Johns County to districts 5 and 4, taking heavily Republican turf out.  As a result, it must go down into Seminole county, which is Republican, but has Democratic pockets.  The district voted for Obama in 2008, but swung away to only 47% in 2012.  However, Nelson won the district with 54%, and it is much more swing-ish than under the current lines.  Congressman DeSantis won’t like these changes.

District 11 (red) — This conservative district loses parts of Ocala to district 3, so it needs new population.  I gave it rural areas that were connecting District 5 to central Florida, in addition to a top sliver of rural Lake County from district 10.  I try to take from the northern areas to avoid effecting districts further south.  Congressman Nugent would feel little effect of the changes.

District 7 (violet) — This Republican district, held by Congressman Mica, gets a makeover.  It has lost half of Seminole County to district 6.  I make up for it by giving it whiter areas that were in district 5 and the white areas that were in the appendage/hook that was part of district 10.  Like district 6, this was an Obama district in 2008, but fell to 47% Obama in 2012 thanks to shifts in the white suburbs.

District 10 (orange) — The final changed district.  Webster gets a short end of the stick here.  Someone was.  the major problem for the Republicans is what to do with the African-Americans in Orlando, who cant be part of district 5 anymore.  There would be no justification to add them to district 9 in the south, which is meant to be a Hispanic district.  Either Mica or Webster must absorb the African-Americans, either move making the district vulnerable.  Splitting the community between the two would scream of partisan design.  Someone must take them all.  In this case, I give it to Webster, which shoots his district up to 54% Obama.

The partisan makeup of these new districts is below.


These African-Americans in Orlando have to go somewhere, and Mica or Webster are most likely to find them in their district.

Orlando Black

This image below shows my new districts with the old boundaries on top, to show where the shifts are.

Potential New Districts with Current Lines

The rest of the state would not be effected by these shifts.

Potential New Districts Statewide

What the legislature ends up doing is hard to say.  They will definitely appeal the decision, and any changes are not likely till 2016.  They can get creative with their changes.  However, the reality of the African-American block in Orlando will mean at least one Republican congressman gets a major headache.  In addition, two districts, 6 and 7, are much more in play for Democrats if a map similar to this is implemented.  No doubt the Republicans can come up with other changes to mitigate Democratic gains, but again, they will be under a microscope.  They can’t risk getting too ambitious.

Primary preview of Florida CD19 Republican Primary [Updated with Results]

Republicans will go to the polls on April 22nd (well, those who haven’t voted by mail yet) to cast a ballot for what has turned into a very contentious primary for Congressional District 19 in Florida.  The district, part of the the southwest suburbs of Florida, has a vacancy thanks to the resignation of Congressmen Trey Radel.  Radel resigned following his conviction for cocaine possession, the first incumbent congressman to be convicted for that charge.  The race has turned into an incredibly costly and bloody affair.  The district is composed of most of Lee county in its north and the coast of Collier County.


The race is largely between three individuals.  The perceived front-runner was State Senator Lizbeth Benacquisto.  Benacquisto has been in the state senate since 2010 and serves as Majority Leader in the chamber.  She is an ally of Don Gaetz, the powerful Senate President.  Benacquisto’s state senate seat covers a large portion of Lee County and she is familiar in the area.  Benacquisto’s initial main challenger was Paige Kreegel, a former state representative who came in third in the Republican primary in 2012 for the then-open seat.  Kreegel’s district only encompassed a few precincts in the northern end of the district, but his appearance on a Republican ballot for the district is a plus for him.  Businessman Curt Clawson, who made his fortune with Hayes Lemmerz, a company that made wheels and brakes for cars, also jumped into the race.  Clawson quickly grew his support by self-funding his campaign to the tune of over $2.6 million as of the latest finance reports.  Benacquisto, meanwhile, has raised $1 million, and Kreegel has raised over $200,000.  Clawson’s self-funding has made him a serious contender for winning the seat.

They campaign has devolved into a very negative affair.  Clawson has focused his messaging on building himself as an outsider, trying to latch onto the Tea Party movement that has swept many anti-establishment politicians into office.  Clawson has secured the endorsements of Michele Bachmann, Rand Paul, and other tea party leaders.  He has hammered Benacquisto and Kreegel as establishment politicians.  Meanwhile, Clawson has come under heavy fire for his business dealings..  Under Clawson’s days leading Hayes Lemmerz, the company laid off thousands, closed plants, and was subject to investigations for the death of a worker in a plant explosion.  In addition, Clawson has come under fire for his business ties to a man convicted of sexual assault on a minor.  A particularly interesting development in the campaign occurred when Clawson showed up at a press conference being held by his other opponents that they were using to attack his ties to the convicted man.  In the last few weeks Clawson has focused is attacks on all the attacks against him, decrying the negative campaign.  Clawson started running an ad with a beach background ocean noise with a text scroll saying he wanted to give voters a break from the negativity.  Benacquisto, meanwhile, has been trying to sure-up her support with social conservatives; getting the endorsements of Mike Huckabee and Sarah Palin.  She has touted her pro-life position, opposing abortion even in cases of rape and incest.  The race is largely seen as coming down to a fight between Benacquisto and Clawson.  Clawson’s money has made him competitive, but if he wins, it may be on the back of the anti-establishment wave.

Another dynamic in the race has been heavy spending by third party groups.  The RPOF itself has gotten involved, funneling over $300,000 to Benacquisto through a string of PAC donations.  The implicity backing by the state party, which they deny, has caused outcry from Tea Party groups and former Representative Connie Mack IV, who has endorsed Clawson.  Heavy TV spending has been reported by third party groups. Roll Call has a detailed breakdown of the third-party spending.  Around $900,000 have been spent on TV by two pro-Kreegel PACS, $600,000 from a pro-Benacquisto PAC, and around $100,000 from a pro-Clawson PAC.

As the race enters its final stretch, it appears Clawson has the momentum. Two polls have showed him leading, one by 4% and another by double digits.  A Clawson win would no doubt be characterized as another outsider win in the GOP civil war between the establishment and tea party.  However, it should be noted Clawson’s self-funding has helped make him viable.  That said, it is still striking that Benacquisto could not only lose, but lose by alot.  

Benacquisto, beside being well financed with a great deal of institutional backing, has represented a large portion of the district in one way or another for the last several years.  Benacquisto started off as a city commissioner in Wellington, a city on the opposite coast of the state.  However, in 2010 she won a state senate seat, district 27, that stretched from Palm Beach to Cape Coral, one coast to another.  Incidentally these two main population centers are connected by Lake Okeechobee and rural farmland and is a great example of the horrendous gerrymandering in Florida.  In 2012, the districts were re-drawn and Benacquisto ran for a state senate district seat, district 30, that covers a good deal of Lee County.  In total, Benacquisto represented, through her old district or current one, over 70% of the voters that cast a ballot in the 2012 Republican primary for congressional district 19.  The map below shows the districts she has represented in the past overlaying the 19th congressional district.

Benacquisto Districts

The Senate district Benacquisto represents now (green) covers a good portion of CD19.  She did not face a Republican primary in 2012 when she won that seat in redistricting, but she did have a Republican primary in 2010 for the old Senate District 27.  She won a three-way primary with 39% of the vote.  However, she actually performed stronger in the western part of the district than the east, even though her city of Wellington was on the eastern half.  The map below shows the primary results for her 2010 primary in the precincts of SD27 that also fell within the current boundaries of CD19.

2010 SD27

Benacquisto bested Sharon Merchant and Mike Lameyer with 41% in the above precincts, two points better than her district-wide percents.  However, she clear was not the choice of a majority of the area.  As numbers come in for the election, how she does in the areas she represented in SD30 or SD27 should be watched carefully.

The precincts in Lee County make up 70% of the votes that were cast in the 2012 primary.  Benacquisto’s familiarity in Lee should help her.  However, the dynamics of the race and Clawson’s apparent surge could undermine that advantage.  There is a base of votes in Collier, but a candidate could lose it and still win a split primary.  In 2012, Radel came in third in Collier but still won the race.

2012 Republican Primary

Using the 2012 primary as a reference, the vote clusters will be in the Cape Coral region of the district in Lee county and the Naples region in North Collier county.

Voting Clusters

Looking at income levels in the district, many of the upper income neigborhoods (the mean income is $80,000 a year) are the same ones that will have a larger number of ballots cast.  Whether these wealthier individuals gravitate to Clawson for his business background, or move against him to his bad business dealings, remains to be seen.


This suburban Republican district has seen a flurry of spending in this race, something that it is unlikely to see again in the near future.  The winner will be damaged, but the Republican nature of the district makes it a very unlikely pickup opportunity.  A suburban, upper income district like CD19 has little “elasticity;” — a willingness to cross party lines and vote in a bipartisan manner.  The last time the district voted Democrat was Bill Nelson against Katherine Harris in 2006, which was a statewide blowout for the Democrat.  You can read more about elasticity here..

So what will this race mean for the continued GOP civil war between the establishment and the tea party?  Its hard to say just yet.  If Clawson has a narrow win or loses to Benacquisto, then his support will be largely attributed to his self-funding abiliy.  However, if Clawson has a large win, coming close to 50%, then it can be assumed that even without self-funding he would be have been a contender thanks to his anti-establishment support.  Including all outside money, he appears to be the largest spender or tied with Benacquisto.  A narrow win would mean anti-establish sentiment wasn’t enough to propel him to victory and that it took his fortune to push him over the top.  We won’t know what this means for the GOP establishment until all the votes are counted Tuesday night.

Election Results Update

As expected, Curt Clawson beat out Senator Benacquisto in the Republican primary. Clawson got 38% of the vote to Benacquisto’s 25% and Kreegel’s 25%.  By all accounts, the “establishment” got just over 50% of the vote considering both Kreegel and Benacquisto spent time in the state legislature.  Clawson won a plurality while self-funding his election, not an overwhelming mandate.  Turnout-wise, Collier has slightly higher turnout than Lee. 37% to 33%.  Lee still dominated the votes cast, with over 70% coming from Lee and under 30% from Collier.

Benacquisto got very little support outside of Lee county.  She came in a distant third in Collier, only gathering 15%.  What most striking about this was that Kreegel did so much better in Collier despite his old house seat being in northern Lee county.  Benacquisto, meanwhile, also lost Lee by 5 points, and only won the region in her state senate district by 260 votes, 32% to 31.2%.  2014 Republican Primary

Clawson was much stronger in Collier and Southern Lee.  Benacquisto won Fort Meyers and split Cape Coral.  He representation in the Senate definitely helped her mitigate loses in northern Lee, but she was decimated outside areas she represented in the past. The results aren’t good for Benacquisto’s future in terms of a congressional run.  She is now doubt weaker and less popular than before this run, and someone like Kreegel could be a bigger threat absent a self-funder.  Benacquisto’s would do well to serve out her Senate tenure (which could go till 2020) and revisit a promotion then.

Joel Osteen Makes Millions off Prosperity Gospel: Does Little for the Poor

Joel Osteen has been on television stations and in bookstores for years as the “smiling preacher.”  Osteen has built and empire through a method of Gospel that does not focus on condemnation or hate; a direct contrast with Christian Right leaders such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson.  Osteen’s message has attacked huge audiences over the the last several years.  His Lakewood Church has over 43,000 seats filled each week and his Television program is broadcast nationwide.  Osteen has strong appeal to many religious Americans because of his happy attitude, less focus on culture war issues, and his promise that God takes care of those who believe.

However, Osteen’s image takes a huge downward trajectory when you begin to examine him in a more critical light.  Osteen has been attacked by conservative Christians for his lack of focus on social issues.  However, where Osteen’s real problems exist are his brand of preaching:  Prosperity Gospel.  This is a version of Christian thought, and a deluded one at that, that God rewards his followers with money, possessions, or other tangible items because of their faith.  This view, beside contradicting numerous passages of the Bible, has been preached for centuries by those who wish to gather followers.  After all, who doesn’t like the idea that God can be your personal ATM if you just pray hard enough.  Osteen claims that he does not preach Prosperity Gospel, but almost every sermon or book talks about people who made financial gain thanks to their “faith in God.”  During his sermons, Osteen will repeatedly use biblical quotes out of context to make it seem like the “rewards” or “blessings” of God are meant to be money, a house, children, or a new job.  Osteen never directly says it, but repeatedly implies that God will intervene to financially help those who believe.

Thanks to Osteen’s appeal with Christians who don’t bother to actually pick up a Bible and just want to hear some smiling guy tell them God loves them, the smiling preacher has accumulated a net worth close to $50 million.  In addition, Osteen’s Lakewood Church just finished $105 million in renovations.  Yes you read that correctly, a man who has a national television show that can be viewed on basic cable by anyone, spent $105 million to renovate a church so that 40,000 people could attend.  Again, let me stress this.  ANYONE can watch his sermons on TV, on the church website, or download the podcasts.  Those 40,000 could all watch/listen from home.  But no, they spent $105 million to renovate a ridiculously lavish building.  Guess how much money was spent on the Cross being used?  None.  Because there is no Cross outside the church.

Meanwhile, Joel Osteen, who loves to talk about how he doesn’t take a salary from the Church, makes his money from books, TV, and speaking tours.  Osteen and his wife recently purchased a mansion worth over $10 million dollars.  The Osteen’s live in the rich suburbs of Houston, not far from the Church.  In addition, they own another house worth $2 million.  Their lavish mansion has three elevators and six rooms.  Let me contrast this with another well-known preacher in America.  Rich Warren, who did the prayer for the 2008 Inauguration of President Obama, has the highest selling religious book, A Purpose Driven Life, in history.  Meanwhile, Warren, indeed a rich man, still lives in the same house they have had for 16 years, drives a 10 year old car, and buys watches at Walmart.  Warren and his wife, meanwhile, push charities and causes for AIDS, gun control, and in the wake of their son’s tragic suicide, mental illness awareness.  Warren and his wife are worth 10 million.  However, that is after they give up 90% of their money to charity.  Yes you read that correct, they give up 90% of their money to charity.  Warren has talked about this, saying it allows him to loosen his grasp on material things in this world.

What does Joel Osteen focus charity efforts on?  He and his wife focus on Feed the Children, a charity that aims to give food to starving children, especially in the third world.  However, the charity has received an F rating from charity watchdog groups. Much of the money goes toward staff, fundraisers, and administrative costs… little to food for children.

Look at where Osteen lives in Harris County.  The following maps show the income and poverty rates of the county.  Osteen and his Church are marked on the map.

Harris Income

Harris Poverty Harris Stamps

Despite being modestly close to downtown Houston, Osteen’s house and church are located away from the lower income, higher poverty areas of the county.  Osteen and his church are located in higher income areas of Houston.  Osteen’s home is in the River Oaks suburb, which is the wealthiest neighborhood in all of Texas (and in the top 10 nationwide).  Lower income area’s are close to the Osteen compound, but the Osteen family could get from their house to church without ever entering a low-income area.

Harris County is 40% Hispanic, and as such Lakewood offers a Spanish service to all who wish to attend.  This sounds nice.  However, look again at the Osteen church and house locations relative to Hispanic residents.

Harris Hispanic

For a county that is 40% Hispanic, the church with a Spanish service is located in the whitest area of the county.

Osteen has made millions off his warped biblical view.  And with that money, he pours little of it into the community around him.  He has also isolated himself off from those who are in the most need.  He lives in one of the most white, wealthy, Republican areas in the state.  His Church cost more than the budgets of most county governments.  It should be no surprise that Osteen has said that apologizing for wealth would be an insult to God.  Osteen can claim he does not preach prosperity gospel.  However, the smiling preacher makes no apologies for his wealth and regularly uses it for his own good.  Osteen does not believe there is anything wrong with being wealthy as long as you put God first.  However, from the way Osteen and his family utilize the money they have made, one cannot help but wonder what comes first for the smiling preacher.

What Really Happened in the CD13 Special Election

A good deal has been written in the last two weeks about the results of the special election for Congressional District 13.  Democrat Alex Sink, Florida’s CFO from 2006 to 2010, lost to Republican lobbyist David Jolly in an expensive special election for the seat of Republican Congressman Bill Young; who passed away a few months ago.  The district had voted for Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012, and for Alex Sink during her 2010 gubernatorial campaign.  The district is 35% Democratic and 37% Republican.  The seat was viewed as prime pickup opportunity for Democrats while Republicans were desperate to hold it.  David Jolly was Young’s preferred successor.  However, the aid-turned-lobbyist had to go through a Republican primary first; where he won with under 50% in a three way race.  Sink, meanwhile, faced no primary challenge.  While Sink out-raised Jolly overall, third party groups evened-up the money battle.  The district was flooded with calls, canvassing, radio and TV ads by the political parties, the candidates, and third party groups.  The race was always going to be close, with polling indicate a 1 to 2 point race.   Polls showing 5 point gaps or more were generally regarded as outliers by many commentators.  Heading into election day, it was my personal view that Sink had an advantage based on the rate of absentee ballot returns.  However, when the results came in, Sink lost the race by 2%.  Despite winning absentee and early votes, Sink lost the election day ballots and thus lost the election.

The map below shows the raw votes cast in each precinct for the election.  In addition it shows how Sink and Jolly did compared to Obama and Romney two years earlier. While Sink won some areas that President Obama lost in the Clearwater area in the north, she lost several regions, especially in Pinellas Park, that the President won.

CD13 Raw Vote 3

Once the results were final, the internet and media was flooded with explanations and hypotheses on what happened.  Many pieces of analysis and criticism were not based on any abject facts, but rather on perceived notions.  Claims of Sink not being liberal enough, to claims the healthcare debate hurt her (she was bombarded with the issue), to gaffs by candidates, or the state of the campaign, were thrown out there with little or no facts, figures, or backup.  Meanwhile, I dug through the data available and waited for Pinellas to release its final turnout figures by party.  It took 2 weeks but the data finally became available.  With the data available to the public, we can now figure out what really happened.

Absentee Chase

Absentee ballots were the largest source of votes cast in the special election.  Early voting provided a handful of votes, but the real fight was over absentee.  Heading into election day, Democrats had a reason to be cautiously optimistic.  Absentee ballot returns rates were narrowly favoring the Republicans, but by a margin less than their 2012 figures.  By election day the Republicans had a 4.7% gap with ballots returned over the Democrats.  This was above the 4% bare minimum they would need to have a chance, but below the 5.76% advantage they held in 2012 when they still LOST the district to President Obama by around 1.5% of the vote.  A side by side of how the ballots were cast by the parties and how they broke down for the Presidential election in CD13 is below. Click the image to see a larger version.


As the table shows, Obama narrowly lost absentee despite the gap in ballots cast against his party.  In addition, a 7% Democratic disadvantage in turnout on election day still saw a near tie when it came to election day ballots for Obama or Romney. These figures reflect the fact that the larger independent population of the district tend to skew towards Democrats.  Sink or Obama could afford to have their base not keep up with the GOP turnout because the independents would swing to the left.  With Democrats performing better turnout-wise with absentee ballots than in 2012, this gave Sink a larger margin of error with election day voting.  As long as the E-Day turnout gap wasn’t much larger than 2012, Sink had a good chance of winning.

When the polls closed on election night, the absentee early vote results were released first.  Alex Sink had won both early vote and absentee ballots.  She held a lead around 48% to Jolly’s 46% (a libertarian candidate took the rest).  The President had lost absentee votes two years earlier.  For myself, this gave me more hope for Sink winning.

However, as election day results came in, the results quickly narrowed and soon Jolly was leading.  By the time all the ballots were counted, Jolly had won.  The culprit was election day, Sink lost it by 12%.  What happened on election day could not be verified until Pinellas released all its turnout figures nearly two weeks after the election.

Election Day – Things Fall Apart

If the ballots for early and absentee voting were the only ones deciding the election, the precinct results would have looked like this.

Before Election Day

However, the precinct map for election day alone looked like this.

Election Day

So what happened on election day?  For two weeks it was impossible to say for sure.  My general belief was that it was a turnout gap much larger than the 7% gap from 2012.  The only other explanation would have been independents voting for Jolly.  However, for Sink to have won absentee ballots, she must have won the independent vote. It was unlikely that Sink would win independents on absentee, but not election day.  In addition, the polls that showed a close race repeatedly showed Sink winning voters with no party affiliation.

Around a week after the election I sat down with the data and tried to get an estimate of what turnout was like on election day.  I started off with the absentee and early vote results.  Pinellas already had the partisan breakdown of turnout for those two voting methods.  Based on the partisan share of the vote, I calculated the percents that each candidate would need from their own party and from independents to end up with the votes they got. I calculated separately for absentee and early voting.  Estimating these vote shares was also aided with cross-tabs from public polls.

In both cases I estimated that each candidate received a vast majority of their party’s vote.  Polls indicated the libertarian took more from Jolly than from Sink, so I calculated that Jolly would have slightly less party unity than Sink.  With absentees, Sink needed around 59% of the independent vote to get the win she did.  With early votes, her margin was achieved with either 70% of independents or even stronger Democratic loyalty.  Early voters generally skew much more liberal and democratic than the rest of the electorate.

I applied roughly the same percents for party loyalty and independent share to the election day ballots cast.  I estimated that, assuming the two parties were largely loyal to their candidate, and independents sticking with Sink, then Republicans would have needed  a 20 point advantage in terms of their share of the electorate casting ballots.  I estimated that the partisan breakdown of those casting ballots on election day was over 50% Republican and just over 30% Democratic.  My work is below, and in this link,


I posted my estimates the weekend after the election.  Otherwise I continued to wait for the final turnout data to be released.  The data became available the next week.

When the data was released, it showed election day had a 17% gap in favor of the Republicans.  Independents made up a larger share of the vote than I estimated.  The electorate on election day was 50% Republican, 32% Democratic, and 18% Independent.  Based on the turnout data I revised my calculations.  Assuming the parties remained loyal, Sink likely won 59% or so of the independent vote.


Comparing the results and turnout in the special election with the ballots cast for President show where the issue lied.  While Sink outperformed the President with absentees and did roughly the same with early votes, she did much worse with election day votes.


While the conservative media tried to frame the loss as a reflection on the healthcare law or the President, the data does not back that claim up.  Sink won the independent vote in the district.  The problem laid in an issue Democrats constantly struggle on, turnout.

Why Was the Turnout Gap so High

Before the data for election day was even released there were already groups trying to explain why turnout was so low.  These groups were reacting to the overall turnout number of 39%.  However, these figures did not include party turnout.  Most assumed, correctly, that Democratic turnout had not kept up with Republicans.  Without the data available, theories began to abound.

The most common theory was the effect of municipal elections on turnout.  Several coastal communities, St Pete Beach being the most prominent, were holding principle elections the same day as the special election.  In some of these municipalities the turnout was higher than the district overall.  In addition, many of these cities were more Republican than Democrat.  Some people argued that the higher turnout in these Republican cities, fueled by local election interest, aided Jolly by inflating Republican turnout.  However, this theory does not hold up to scrutiny.  It was not just a handful of beach cities hosting elections.  Eleven municipalities had local races that evening.

City Voting

In some of these cities turnout was much higher than the district-wide turnout.  St Pete Beach, a small Republican city, won the turnout race with 54%.  The turnout spike in St Pete Beach and the surrounding area fueled the narrative that municipal elections drove up the vote in key areas.   However, when you combine all eleven municipalities together, you get a different story.

First and foremost, turnout was not high in every city hosting a local election. Turnout ranged from 33% to 54%.  Second, several of these cities have more registered Democrats than Republicans, and even more were evenly divided. Clearwater, the largest municipality holding elections, is evenly split between the parties. Third, Democratic turnout was outpaced by Republican turnout in ten of the eleven municipalities.  When voters went to the polls in those ten areas, the electorate was more Republican than the registration figures.  The issue was not that Republican cities were voting, it was that Democrats were not as energized across the board.  Fourth, the notion that local elections drove higher turnout does not add up.  Looking back at turnout for these municipalities, I found the last time each had a local race, and turnout was much lower back then; with the exception of Kenneth City.  These municipalities saw a spike in turnout, indicating that the special election drove people to the polls, not the municipal races.  Fifth, and final, the combined areas hosting municipal elections were more Democratic than those not hosting down ballot races.  The combined cities voted for President Obama 50.9% to 47.6%, and narrowly voted for Jolly 47.9% to 46.8%.  The registration figures were nearly even, and the Democratic under-performance was smaller in the cities than it was outside the cities.  This excel file shows all the cities that had local races; including their registration and ballots cast. It shows the Democratic margins (mostly negative) for registration and cast votes.  Then it shows if the margin improved or got worse based on turnout.  It shows the turnout for this year and for the last time each city had a municipal race.  It then shows the totals for all the cities combined, the totals for the non-city areas, and the totals for the district.  As the data shows, the city areas were better territory for Democrats.


So, if not municipal elections, what caused Democrats to underperform Republicans?

Candidate Quality

This is where blogs and news articles spent a good deal of time guessing.  One issues brought up was candidate appeal.  Some claimed Alex Sink didn’t appeal to the base, or didn’t seem charismatic enough.  However, this negates the fact that Democratic turnout lagged Republican turnout in a special election for Florida House District 36 the previous fall. In that race, the Democrat, Amanda Murphy, won a close battle.  The district was 37% Democratic and 34% Republican.  However, of the votes cast for that race, 46% were Republican and 37% were Democratic.  This included a 18% gap in favor of the GOP on election day and a 5% gap on absentee.  Murphy was well liked by Democrats and proved to be a very strong candidate, but Republicans still won the turnout battle.  The Murphy win very likely came from stronger cross-over support from Republicans thanks to her support from the GOP State House member who was leaving the seat, Mike Fasano.  In addition, the Republican challenger, Bill Gunter, was painted as too far-right for the district.  The party-level turnout for the HD36 race is below.  Despite the GOP turnout advantage, Murphy won by 300+ votes.


Murphy was a strong candidate with charisma and fit the district well.  However, turnout for Democrats still lagged.  The cause for this was not Murphy’s appeal as a candidate.  Therefore, we cannot just assume that turnout lagged in CD13 because of Sink’s appeal or lack-there-of.

Special Elections are Special

The issue of turnout is a complex issue for Democrats across the county.  In both the special elections, Democrats used a well-publicized ground game to push voters to the polls. I have no doubt that no ground game would have resulted in greater turnout disparities.  However, major parts of the Democratic base are made up of two key groups, young voters and minorities.  Both groups are subject to vote less and special elections are especially the case.  This is why Nate Silver, Dave Wasserman, and other experts, will always tell you that special elections are special.  Rarely do special elections mark indicators of coming waves.  Democrats lost the NYC special election a year before President Obama was re-elected, Republicans lost an upstate New York race a year before their 2010 landslide.  Special elections are only indicators if they occur in ground where one party has little hope for success.  The string of Democratic special election wins in conservative districts in Illinois, Louisiana, and Mississippi foretold the 2008 cycle.  In addition, contrary to claims, running avid liberals do not guarantee higher democratic turnout.  Many liberals have lost elections in years with depressed turnout and many conservative democrats have won elections on the coattails of Obama or on their own.

So what happened to Alex Sink?  In short, she lost because of turnout on election day.  Why was turnout so rough?  The Democratic base is made up of those who would not be considered super voters.  Questions about Sink and her ability to connect to voters, and particularity her inability to articulate her ties to the Pinellas area, may have turned off some voters.  However, I believe any gaffs or bad quotes aided more in limiting cross-over support from moderate Republicans than it did in depressing Democratic turnout.  Democratic turnout was reasonably high for a special election, it just was not enough.  Remember, the district is largely white and older.  Older white voters skew toward the GOP, and they vote.  The beach communities didn’t cast ballots because they had local races, they voted because they are affluent; a group which constantly votes in higher numbers. Look at the turnout map below.


Now, look at the average income in the district

Raw Vote Special

Those conservative costal areas had something more in common than hosting munical elections.  Those areas are higher income.  Thus, they were more likely to vote, and more likely to vote Republican at that.  The demographics of the district, this just being one, made turnout an easier task for Republicans.  The GOP base is older and wealthier, thus more likely to vote.  The Democratic base on young, minorities, and working class, are less likely to vote.  Add in that this district is largely white, older, and wealthier, and it’s no surprise the turnout gap was so high.

Claims that Obamacare doomed Sink do not hold up, claims that she wasn’t liberal enough do not hold, claims that she wasn’t appealing enough don’t hold.  Special elections are tricky, you win some and lose some. Democrats won the HD36 special while being outspent by hundreds of thousands of dollars. They lost CD13 a few months later.  I don’t consider this a reflection on anything other than special elections continuing to be special, subject to turnout.  The electorate casting ballots does not reflect the electorate as a whole.  Democrats will continue to find ways to increase turnout among their base.  Republicans will continue to hope that does not happen.  As the special election showed, attacks on Obamacare are not working. Sink won the independents resoundingly.  If Democrats can increase Democratic turnout by a few more points, then Republicans will find themselves in real trouble.  If Democrats cannot increase their base’s turnout, then they will find themselves short of a House majority anytime in the near future.

Is abortion hurting Wendy Davis with Texas Hispanics?

A great deal of the focus on Tuesday night’s Texas Primaries were on the Republican side of the ballot.  Democrats had a few primaries to watch, but Republican fights for Lt Governor and a handful of congressional seats were the focus of most election watchers like myself. In fact the big story from Tuesday was Lt Governor Dewhurst coming in second in his primary for re-election, in addition to Congressman Hall’s need for a primary runoff to hold his seat.  However, articles are appearing all over local and national press about the Democratic Primary for Governor in the state of Texas. Most casual observers may not have known that Democrat Wendy Davis, the star candidate out of Texas, famous for her filibuster to a state senate bill to dramatically restrict abortion rights (including a 20 week abortion ban and massive regulation aimed to close clinics), had a primary to secure the nomination for the Democrats. Davis faced an unknown opponent, Rynaldo Madrigal, who raised no money and won the nomination with 79% of the vote.  Republican Attorney General Greg Abbot won his primary with 91%.  Davis’ defeat of Madrigal was no surprise.  However, what is being pointed out by the Press and the Republican Party of Texas is that Davis lost several Hispanic counties in southern Texas.

2014 Texas Dem Primary

The southern border of Texas is a heavily Hispanic region of the state and a major source of Democratic votes.

Texas Hispanic

Democrats routinely lose Texas by 10% or more, even when pushing strong candidates. Both the 2010 and 2006 Governor races saw Democrats put up a fight for the state but come up short.  In all three races the Democrats relied on the southern region of the state for wins.

2006 Governor — Courtesy of Inqvisitor on wikipedia


2010 Governor — Courtesy of Romeisburning on Wikipedia



This region is giving its votes to an unknown candidate against Wendy Davis, who has very high recognition and has already been spending money in the state.

The Republicans are quick to pounce on this news (this Politico article has both sides), claiming it shows Davis is weak with Hispanics, most of whom are Catholic in south Texas, because of her stance on abortion.  Democrats contend that it was the Hispanic surname of Davis’ opponent that allowed him to win those counties.   Local Democratic leaders in the area have argued both things may be true; that Davis is weakened with Hispanics because of abortion, and that Madrigal’s name got him votes in the south.

I was inclined to think that the name had more to do with the votes in south Texas.  However, I couldn’t help but wonder how a complete unknown could beat the rising star of Texas Democrats just because he was Hispanic.  Davis isn’t some generic Democratic candidate, she is a major player in the state.  Perhaps the abortion issue was real and not just a GOP talking point.  Looking to polling, I believe I found an answer.

So first let me state something for those who don’t follow Texas politics..  The Hispanics of Texas are not as Democratic as Hispanics nationwide.  Republicans normally get 35% or more of the vote and can crack the high 30s or low 40s.  Hispanics in Texas are predominately Catholic and thus more conservative on social issues.  Meanwhile, Republicans in Texas don’t appear to have killed their image with Hispanics like the California Republicans did back in the 1990s. Davis’ pathway to victory isn’t just winning the Hispanic vote, she needs to crush Abbot with Hispanics.  White voters will only go so far in Texas and are firmly entrenched in the Republican camp.  Davis’ path to victory relies on a mixture of high Hispanic turnout and high Hispanic margins.  Polling, however, shows that Davis is not getting the numbers she needs with Hispanics.

Polling has been minimal in Texas, so I am going to rely on two polls from Public Policy Polling.  The firm polled the race in June 2013, shortly after Davis made national waves for her filibuster.  The June numbers were hypothetical, as Davis had not declared her plans to run.

  • In June, Davis lost to Abbott 48-40.  She had 40% approval and 14% disapproval with Hispanics.  She got 47% of Hispanics to Abbott’s 31%.  The abortion law was little known with Hispanics, 12% supported the law while 25% were against it.

Then, as the months went on, Davis announced she would run for governor and the campaign began.  In October, pro-life groups began running Spanish-language ads attacking Davis on abortion.  The ads focused entirely on the 20 week abortion ban. Public Policy Polling did a follow up poll a month later.

  •  In November, Davis lost to Abbott 50-35.  Her approval with Hispanics remained 40%, but her disapproval grew to 35%.  Abbott was then taking 43% of the Hispanic vote to Davis’ 38%.  Hispanics remained divided on the abortion law, but most knew about it; 40% favored the law, 43% were against.


Those shifts show a very problematic trend for Davis.  Hispanics lean toward Abbott, who has been campaigning for the Hispanic vote.  Abbott is hoping to get more than Rick Perry’s 38% from 2010.  Abbott has toned down his rhetoric (he is very conservative) and his wife, who is of Hispanic decent, has been prominently featured.  Abbott’s polling position with Hispanics, if unchanged, would ensure his victory.  Republican candidates who have won in the past did worse with Hispanics than Abbott is now.

In fact, here is the 2008 Presidential Election in Texas, the 2010 Gubernatorial election Texas, and current 2014 polling.  McCain in 2008 won Texas with 11 points and Perry in 2010 won by 12.  Neither did as well with Hispanics as Abbott is in polling.


Now, Davis could still win the Hispanic vote, and the November poll is some time back (PPP has not released another one).  However, these polling numbers conform with Davis’ problems in south Texas on primary night.  It is just unlikely that the name of her opponent would be enough to cause such deviation from the rest of the statewide vote.

What also appears clear is that the abortion bill Davis filibustered is not a winning issue with Hispanics.  At best Hispanics are divided on the issue, and the trend-lines show a dramatic increase in support for restrictions.   This is no doubt thanks to Republicans framing the bill as more about the 20-week ban (a popular position nationwide) than on the sneaky regulations that aimed to close clinics.


Now, the abortion restriction question was worded different between June and November (with June referencing the bill itself), which could explain why so many voters were undecided on the issue.  However, Hispanic voters in the June poll were asked if the supported Davis’ filibusterer, and 85% registered an opinion.  Hispanic voters supported Davis’ filibusterer by a 46-35 margin.  The 35% against, however, shows the social conservative influence of Texas Hispanics.  

Now, Davis’ campaign as certainly not been running on the abortion issue.  In fact, Davis garnered press when she said she could support a 20-week ban on abortions as a stand alone bill.  Davis’ campaign has been focused on education, immigration, wages, and other issues important to Catholic Hispanics.  However, it does appear the attacks from October and onward have had an effect.  Without more polling it is hard to confirm anything regarding Texas Hispanics, Wendy Davis, and abortion.  More polling, with cross-tabs, is needed.

What I do know for sure is this.  Davis has a very tight window for victory in Texas.  If the Hispanic numbers do not turn around in a major way, then sadly, the slim chances Democrats have in Texas in 2014 will completely evaporate.


What Whatcom County and the City of SeaTac tell us about the nationalization of local elections

The premier races of November 2013 were found in Virginia, New York, and New Jersey.  Political pundits focused on how big a win New Jersey Governor Chris Christie would win by, if the Democrats would sweep all three statewide offices, and if DeBlasio would win New York City by more than a 40-point margin.  However, in the county of Whatcom and the city of SeaTac, millions were being spent on elections that no one in the rest of the country knew were going on.  This article focuses on two pares of local elections, how they became a political battlefield unlike anything they had ever seen before, and what it means for the future of local races.

Coal in Whatcom County, WA

While outside money poured into Virginia, making it the premier destination for SuperPACs, environmentalists and the coal industry were focused on a string of local elections on the Northwest corner of the country.  In little-known Whatcom County, home to 205,000, a major fight over national and international policy, fueled by unprecedented fundraising and outside money, turned what are normally quiet county commission elections into a national referendum.

The fuel to these elections was the Gateway Pacific Terminal, a proposed $600 terminal that would sit in Whatcom County.  The terminal in question would received coal shipped via train from states like Wyoming and then shipped via boat to China.  The terminal would have been the biggest on the west coast.  The issue quickly became a concern of the environmental movement, as coal burned in China still affects the overall CO2 levels of the world’s atmosphere.  Coal companies wanted the terminal built and Whatcom had the space for the proposal.  The belief was that the council had the votes to narrowly approve the measure.  However, the proposal would not be finalized before the regularly scheduled elections for four of the seven council seats.  This set up a massive fight over the issue that engulfed the local elections.  Four of the seven commissioners were up for re-election.  Two of the incumbents, Kershner and Knutzen, were conservatives who likely supported the measure, two were liberals, Weimer and Mann, who likely did not.  I say likely because commissioners were barred by state law from stating their positions on upcoming issues during elections.  The two conservative commissioners were challenged by liberals, while the two liberals were challenged by conservatives.  Each side hoped to hold their two incumbents and knock off the other sides two incumbents.  Donations flowed into the bank accounts of the incumbents and challengers, and outside funding spiked as well.  Who’s side each candidate was on became noted quickly as environmental and coal money pored into the county.  In total, the 8 individuals on the ballot, the 4 incumbents and 4 challengers, raised over $600,000; with the liberal incumbents out-raising their opponents and the liberal challengers out-raising the people they hoped to unseat.  Both the county Democrats and county Republicans found their war-chests growing with either pro or anti coal funds.  In addition, over $400,000 in outside money was dumped into the state in third party ads. Overall, environmentalists fueled by the League of Conservation Voters and billionaire Tom Seyer outspent the pro-coal side.

Television ads were non-stop and mailboxes were flooded with glossy pieces.  Many mailers focused on slate-like voting, advocating all 4 liberal or all 4 conservatives running.

1 2 3

Other lines of attack were used.  Earlier in the year the council approved 4-3 to have a slaughterhouse built in part of the farmland of the county.  The conservatives who voted yes were attacked for that vote.


And while the coal terminal fueled the money, social issues were used as attacks as well.

5 6

With the coal terminal illegal to discuss, all different types of issues were used to prop up or tear down different candidates.  But one frequent tactic from the third-party groups were slate-level voting rather than individual focuses.  The conservative incumbents and challengers were often attacked as tea-party members and television ads tied the conservative members of the county to national Republicans like John Boehner.  In a county that gave Obama 55% of the vote, liberal groups and candidates aimed to nationalize the elections as much as possible.

The campaigning continued for months and weeks until election day finally arrived in November.  The results tell us a lot about how effective the campaigning was.

The results… a major victory for the environmental movement.  The two conservative incumbents, Kathy Kershner and Bill Knutzen, were ousted from the council, while the liberal incumbents, Carl Weimer and Ken Mann, held on.  This shifted the power of the council from 4-3 conservative to 5-2 liberal.  The coal terminal was surely dead.

What is most striking about these results is not just who won or who lost, but how close all four of the elections were tied together.  All council seats are elected at-large, and the difference in percentages and votes was very narrow between all four seats.  The following four maps show the results for each seat.  (Authors Note:  You can click any image to open it in a new page and zoom in if you desire).

This was conservative commissioner Kershner’s loss

Whatcomb 1A

Liberal Ken Mann held on in his re-election

Whatcomb 2A

Liberal Weimer also held on in his re-election.

Whatcomb 3A

And conservative Knutzen lost his re-election.

Whatcomb ATLG

The two liberal challengers scored almost the exact same percentages, with a raw vote difference of 274.  The two liberal incumbents had a slightly larger difference in the vote, as Carl Weimer proved to be slightly more popular, however, the vote difference between the two incumbents was less than 600 votes.  Over 64,000 votes were cast for each seat.

The population of Whatcom is focused in the western edge of the state, with a large chunk of the population in the city of Bellington, which is a coastal city in the area were the dark-blue precincts reside.

Whatcomn dot density Bellingham

Bellingham itself is a major source of Democratic support and rests along the coast.  30,000 votes, just under half the total, came from within the cities’ precincts.

The elections showed a great deal of loyalty at the precinct level.  Only a handful of precincts switched votes between conservative and liberal candidates.  The conservatives did best in the more rural north while the southern areas voted heavily for the liberal slate.


To further examine how tied each race was to the other, I looked at vote differences between candidates at a precinct level.  To start off, I looked at the difference in the percents between the two liberal challengers.

Challenger Difference

Most of the precincts had a vote difference with 0% and 4%.  Vote differences were lowest in Democratic stronghold Bellingham and spiked in rural areas.  The mean difference in the precincts were 2.8%.

Next I looked at the differences between the liberal incumbents.

Incumbent Difference

Again, differences were low.   The mean difference in the precincts were 2.9%. However the upper rural area had a larger vote difference while the difference in the south was incredibly low.  The differences in he north were because Weimer outperformed Mann in the north.

Then I looked at the average of the liberal challengers and the average of the liberal incumbents at the precinct level.

Incumbent over Challenger

Margins were small.  Meanwhile the liberal incumbents outperformed the liberal challengers in the more populated south while the challengers did better in a handful of rural and city precincts.

The correlation between liberal incumbent and liberal challenger percents at the precinct level are very consistent.  The scatterplot below shows how tight the correlation is.

Average Scatter

The difference between the highest and lowest percent for the four liberals was less than 3%.  Precinct level differences between Buchanan and Weimer is below.

Weimer’s stronger performance in the north was a major source of the difference, while the two had the smallest difference in Bellingham.  Overall, Bellingham had the narrowest differences in many different criteria.  The democratic city stuck with the liberal slate and did not deviate.


The four county council elections weren’t just tied to each other.  On the ballot was a statewide referendum on the labeling of GM crops.  The measure was supported by environmentalists, but failed statewide.  However, the measure was approved within Whatcom, almost at the same level as the liberal candidates for county commission.

GM Crops

Support for the measure came from the same areas that supported the liberal slate.

How the precinct-level vote for the measure compared to that of the liberal incumbents (who performed closer to the support for the measure than the liberal challengers) is below.

GM Crops Over

The measure actually performed worse in the southern end of the county, including Bellingham.  Meanwhile, it overperformed in the areas that were opposed to the liberal incumbents.  There were large differences in the vote in rural and city areas.  However, only a small number of precincts voted for the GM amendment and against the liberals, or vice-versa. One possible reason for the overperformance in the north could have been farmers supporting a measure that could potentially weaken competition.  Those gains may have helped offset the loses in the south where the population was being bombarded by anti-labeling advertising by different food cooperation who were against the measure and outspent the supports.

While the liberal slate and GM labeling won out in Whatcom, it wasn’t a clean sweep for liberals.  One Republican-aligned official to hold on was Port Commissioner Dan Robbins.  The position in question, responsible for management of the ports on the counties cost, was elected county-wide.  Robbins managed to narrowly win re-election against a Democratic-aligned candidate. The Democrats thought they had a shot at this seat as well, but were shocked when Robbin’s managed to survive while the conservative commissioners were swept out.  Robbins did three points better than the conservative commissioners  However, while he held overperformed the conservative commissioners, his precinct-level vote strongly correlated with those same individuals.

Robbins Scatter

Robbins’ correlation line (yellow) closely matches a perfect correlation (red line).  The key difference was that Robbins did better in the heavily liberal precincts and ended up performing slightly worse in the conservative precincts.  A precinct-level map of Robbins overperforming is below.

As the precinct map shows Robbins’ source of extra votes did NOT come from the more conservative north, in fact Robbins did worse than the conservative commissioners in the more rural region.  Robbins’ winning votes came from the liberal south, including the city of Bellingham.  This conforms with the findings from the scatterplot above.  Overall Robbin’s was still crushed in the Bellingham region, but he did much better than the conservatives, and with Bellingham accounting for almost half the votes cast, those gains ensured Robbins’ win.


So why did Robbins hold on?  Well the answer partly comes down to the fact that the race was not the focus of third party efforts from the liberal side.  Meanwhile, coal-supporting PACs did back Robbins for re-election.  This race was never the major focus of environmental groups because the terminal’s fate was in the hands of the county commission.  The lack of green money, while the coal money remained, were definitely a contributing factor in Robbins’ re-election.

The commission elections in Whatcom showed an amazing degree of slate-unity and were no doubt nationalized by the outside money and large fundraising.  However, Whatcom wasn’t the only region in Washington to be bombarded by outside spending.

Wages in SeaTac

Several counties south, in the small city of SeaTac, a referendum over wages sparked a million dollar campaign.  The city, who’s primary employer was the SeaTac-Tacoma International Airport, had a referendum on raising the minimum wage to $15 an hour, the highest proposed in the nation.  The campaign resulted in $1.1 million being spent by pro-labor and anti-labor factions.  Money poured in for canvassing, phone calls, television, and mail  The measure won, by the narrowest margin.


In the city of Seatac, $1.1 million was spent on a proposal that was voted on by 6,000 people.  That means $182 was spent per vote, which must one of the all time records.  Each side wanted a victory to give momentum to their side as national fight over the minimum wage grew.  This election marks the peak of the nationalization of local elections.  The people so SeaTac wanted their wages in the service industry at the airport to be better.  However, the nationalization turned it into something more than one town’s issue, it became the centerpiece of a national issue.

The Future of Local Races

The effect of the SeaTac referendum is still to be seen, as the courts are debating if the airport employees are subject to the local law.  However, the results from Whatcom killed the proposed coal terminal.  It is unlikely that the next time SeaTac or Whatcom hold elections they will see such a bombardment of advertising.  Things may return to normal for these areas.  However, what can be taken from 2013 is simple, no jurisdiction, and no issue, is exempt from being nationalized and turned into a million dollar fight.  As SuperPACs grow on both sides and local elections continue to be seen as referendums on larger issues, this trend will continue.  If you life in a small little town or county and enjoy the relative peacefulness of your local races, then watch out, the next national fight might be come to your back yard before you know it.

Broward County Commission Districts Disenfranchise Minority Voters

Through 2011 and 2012, Broward County, the second largest county in Florida, went through its redistricting process.  The 9-member county commission, made up of 8 Democrats and 1 Republican, had to redraw the commission lines in preparation for the 2012 elections to account for population shifts over the last 10 years.  The commission held hearings, took testimony, and allowed groups and citizens to submit maps.  After months of debate and proposals, the commission settled on a final map.

Map 8 - Initial Map

The heavy blue lines are the new boundaries while the different colors represent the different cities (35 in total) of Broward.  If the lines look convoluted to you then you aren’t the only one.  Cities are broken up for no legitimate reasons and reports of the commissioners using their influence to ensure favorable turf were well reported in the press.  The lines also produced districts who’s racial makeup do not match the county at-large.  In fact, the districts appear to willfully split the minority voters, especially Hispanics, across lines, diluting their power.

Broward County is is a very racially diverse region of the state.  As the 2010 Census, it is 43% White, 27% Black, and 25% Hispanic.  However, the redistricting of the commission boundaries produced 7 white districts, 1 black district, and one district tied between Black and Hispanic residents.

Map 5 - Redistricting Current Lines

How did that racial breakdown come about?  Look to the next map, which shows each census block in Broward colorized by their dominant racial makeup.  See the where the commission lines go.

Map 1 - Redistricting Blocks Current Lines

The lines crack Hispanic pockets of voters across different districts.  Hispanic pockets in the west and south are spread out over four different districts.  Meanwhile the black community in the center of the county is packed heavily into one district rather than aiming for a second minority district in the area.

These lines go out of their way to split minority voters up. This is not an issue of drawing weirdly drawn districts to create minority districts; rather it is a case where compact districts that gave minority voters a united say where scrapped in favor of politically-motivated, oddly drawn, boundaries.

The commission cannot claim that the above map was the best that could have been done.  Below is a cleaner, fairer, map that I created.

Map 2 - Redistricting Blocks New Lines

I aimed to balance three criteria when creating the boundaries above. 1) Increase minority voter power 2)  Be as compact as I can, and 3)  Respect city boundaries where possible.  These three tasks are a tough balancing act.  Many of Broward’s cities are very un-compact and several of them are racially split.  Southern cities like Miramar and Pembroke Pines have strong east-west racial differences.  With criteria 1 being most important, a racially divided city would be split.

The results were much more in tune with Broward’s racial makeup. Four districts where white, 1 was majority black, 2 where plurality black, and 2 where plurality Hispanic.

Map 3 - Redistricting New Lines

Creating a majority Hispanic district would have required sacrificing the second Hispanic seat.   The full breakdown of the new districts is below.

Map 9 - Chart

Hispanic voters are the plurality in districts 1 and 3, but also are strong minorities in districts 2 and 7.  African-Americans are favored in districts 2, 6,and 7; especially when the Democratic primaries, which would tilt more African-American, decide most races in Broward.  The map makes it so that minorities could make up 5 of the 9 commissioners.

While also being more racial sensitive, these boundaries are reasonable compact and try to respect city boundaries as much as possible.

Map 4 - Redistricting Cities New Lines

While this map would give minority voters a larger say in the representation on the commission, there are still a few hiccups.  The main issue lies with Hispanics.  Hispanic’s have a much lower registration rate than white or black voters in Broward.  It has always been the case that minority voter registration is lower.  However, Hispanic registration is especially low in Broward.  While part of this can be attributed to immigration (people counted by the census but are not citizens) it does not explain registration drop-offs in major suburban sectors where non-citizen populations are very low.  In addition, the 16% of Broward residents that are non-citizens are not all Hispanic, many are Caribbean black as well; yet Hispanic registration drop-off is much higher than the drop-off among black residents.

Below is the census tracts of Broward by race.

Map 7 - Tract Race

Hispanic pockets are concentrated in the south and in the mid-western region (which is the city of Weston).  Now look at the racial makeup by voter registration.

Map 6 - Precinct Race

Look how high the dropoff for Hispanic registration it; falling to 16%.  Especially focus on the area of Weston.  That suburb is affluent and well educated.  It is 45% white and 45% Hispanic.  However, registration wise, it is 53% white and 38% Hispanic.  This drop-off is happening in a well-educated, well-to-do area with a low non-citizen population.  It means this issue of Hispanic drop-off in registration goes beyond socioeconomic ties.  It is an issue that also effects the true power of these proposed county commission lines.

Under my lines, Hispanics are a plurality in two districts.  However, registration wise, they are the plurality in zero.  The drop-off in registration is steep enough that the Hispanics lose influence in both districts.  They are still well positioned in district 1 because they started off so strong, but lose a great deal of ground in district 3.  Look at the side by side of the districts by census data and then by registration to see the full effect (click it for zoom in).

Map 10 - Chart 2

The issue of Hispanic registration drop-off has been a long-standing issue that will take time to resolve.  In the shorter term, however, are the current commission lines in Broward.  Even with the registration drop-off, Hispanics would be able to unite and influence the election of my district 1.  However, under the current lines they are effectively shut out; divided over several districts and at a disadvantage in the one they are tied with blacks in.  In addition, black voters are shortchanged with two districts instead of three.  The current lines create 7/9 white districts in a county that is only 43% white.  Its impossible to say for sure that race was a factor (I do not believe that the Democratic commissioners are racist).  However, I do believe this was about preserving power of the incumbents.  These boundaries make no logical sense racially or city-wise.  Communities of interest are broken up and weakened.  Broward voted overwhelmingly for the Fair Districts amendments in 2010.  It is time their own internal boundaries met the standards that those amendments stood for.

Rick Scott’s new Lt Governor hardly helps in Miami-Dade

Tomorrow morning (or really soon), Rick Scott will announce Miami-Dade Property Appraiser, Carlos Lopez-Cantera, as his new Lt Governor.  Cantera is known well inside Tallahassee circles from his days as Majority Leader in the Florida House, serving under past Speaker Dean Cannon.  He served until 2012 when he was termed out of office and promptly ran for Property Appraiser in his home county.  Cantera won the officially non-partisan election by ousting the incumbent Republican, Pedro Garcia, in the August primaries.  With only two candidates running, no runoff was required.  Cantera capitalized on problems within the incumbents office; from bad appraisals (that were often overruled when a homeowner appealed a decision) to a lack of transparency and easy access to information.  Perhaps the biggest story was when Garcia told the city of Miami that they would have to pay property taxes on a new parking garage for Marlins Stadium, after he had initially told them they would be excempt.  Cantera, still in the legislature, maneuvered a provision into law that made the parking garage tax exempt (despite legislative staff advising that the exemption was likely to be unconstitutional).

Not long after, Cantera filed for Property Appraiser and promptly raised $262,000 for the race.  Garcia, meanwhile, only raised $112,000 (still alot but not enough for the Miami market).  Cantera was able to go on TV while Garcia had to stick to radio.  In addition, a political committee, Citizens for Lower Property Taxes, formed in Miami-Dade and raised $207,000.  The committee claimed to be supporting Amendment 4, which would go on the ballot in November.  However, the committee spent its money on ads and mailers for Cantera.  The committee has been linked to Cantera, and it spent no real money after the primary.  (see the money link here  ).

So in all, Cantera had nearly $500,000 to spend while Garcia just has his $112,000.   Cantera won the election, but by a narrow margin.

Miami Property Appraiser

Cantera won with 51.2% of the vote.  He got 105,950 votes compared to Garcia’s 100,971.  As the map shows, Cantera won big in traditionally Cuban areas and in the city of Miami.  Cantera and his committee had to spend over $4 a vote compared to Garcia’s 90 cents.  Cantera would have lost had he not outspent Garcia by such a large margin.  Cantera lost election day and early voting while racking up a large absentee ballot margin (in a county known for campaigns paying individuals good money to round up absentee ballots in a system that has a lot of scrutiny to it).

Turnout for the primaries was 20% while turnout for this election was 16%.  Voters interviewed in the press often admitted they didn’t know either candidate well and where there to vote for Mayor (a race that saw well over $1,000,000 spent).  Cantera effectively won 8% of Miami-Dade voters in an race that was not the main attraction to average voters.

Cantera’s knowledge of Miami-Dade politics could certainly benefit Scott (if he listens), and no doubt Cantera has been chosen to try and get back Republican support in Miami-Dade.  However, it will take more than appointing Cantera for Scott to have any hope at getting a decent share of the vote in the county (winning it is out of the question).  Lt Governors are never well known in Florida, and Cantera is unlikely to be well known by average voters in Miami-Dade (he has only been in the office for a year).  Cantera being Hispanic will hardly override Scott’s hard-line positions on immigration either. We will have to see how things play out over the next few months, but right now, Cantera’s choice is hardly a game changer.  While Scott may have a Miami-Dade politician in his pocket, Democrats have this map of Barack Obama’s 62% in the county on election night 2012.  All that blue is what made Rick Scott go for a Miami-Dade politician.  However, that selection is not enough.

2012 President

Party strength at the local level in Florida: What It means for Florida Democrats

When people focus on Florida’s politics, they tend to look at the county level votes for President, Governor, or Senate.  From that they develop a few key conclusions:  Democratic performance is largely concentrated in the urban counties, Republicans dominate rural county and west-coast suburban counties, the I-4 corridor is the key swing region of the state, and only a few Democrats like Bill Nelson can cross over into the rural counties for support.  However, this is only half of the political picture for Florida.  The state’s politics are much more complicated that what was just described.  Many rural counties in the state, especially in the northern panhandle are ancestrally Democratic and still vote that way in local elections.  Regions that statewide Democrats lose in are still casting ballots for Democratic local officials.  Democrats should look to these local officials as the start of a pathway back to prominence in rural Florida.

Last month I took a look at the partisan breakdown of the county commissions in Florida. The results showed Democratic strength in Florida’s panhandle and several rural farming counties; expanding from their usual base of support in the urban counties that allow them to win statewide elections.   To further this look at local politics, I examined the partisan breakdown of the constitutional officers in the counties.

The state of Florida allows for the election of up to six designated constitutional officers in each county. These officers are elected county-wide and are normally on a partisan ballot. Counties can designate for the appointment of these offices in lieu of election; meanwhile some counties have explored merging and/or eliminating some offices they no longer feel are needed.  The officers that can be elected are as follows.

Tax Collector — This individual leads the department that collects taxes and fees collected at the local level (like your car registration or a traffic ticket).  The office does not set tax rates, but rather it collects fees.

Property Appraiser — This office is responsible for assessing the value of properties for the purposes of assessing taxes on said properties.  The office is often used to assign exemptions (as outlined by law) to different property-related taxes.

Sheriff — This is the chief law enforcement officer of each county.  The sheriff hires and fires staff and officers, maintains county jails, and carries out Florida and county laws in coordination with state and local law departments.

Superintendent — This individual works with the school board to meet school needs in each county.  The office has a greet deal of administrative hiring and firing ability.  School policy is often relegated to the school board.  However, superintendent has a strong amount of unilateral authority of different issues.

Clerk of Court — This office is in essence the clerk of the county.  It works with the court system and the county government to process permits, legal briefs, marriage licenses, budget reviews, and much more.

Supervisor of Elections — This individual runs the office that manages elections in each county.  The SOE has final say on where precincts boundaries are, where polling locations end up, and how to manage voting procedure.  Supervisors are subject to state law, however they can refuse certain mandates by the state (such as voter purges).  A supervisor can be removed from office by the Governor if incompetence leads to major election issues.

In most instances, these elections are not high profile.  Incumbents often hold on to their jobs as long as no issues of incompetence arise.  Party affiliation can be less of a handicap in these elections if a specific candidate is considered more qualified.  However, there have been several instances of party affiliation either dooming or assuring the election of a candidate.  Perhaps the most recent and telling example was when Republican Sheriff Al Lamberti of Broward County lost to a Democratic challenger despite raising more money, receiving newspaper endorsements, and overall being considered a good sheriff.  Lamberti had held of Democratic Scott Israel in 2008, but finally fell in 2012 by a six percent margin.2012 Sheriff


Lamberti lost despite winning many suburban precincts that President Obama also won.  However, it was not enough to counter the unbelievably blue hue of the county.

Sheriff Analysis

The Broward Sheriff’s race is just one example (certainly the most high profile of 2012) of party ID being a burden on a qualified candidate or incumbent.  The results of this race should be remembered for those looking at the rest of the constitutional offices and the partisan future of them.

Overall, Republicans control a majority of these local offices.  As seen in the post on county commissions, democratic strength statewide resides in a handful of heavily-populated counties while Republicans dominated the low-populated but numerous rural counties.  The result is Republicans control most local offices that are designated to each county regardless of population size.  However, local Democratic officers are not limited just to the counties that President Obama won (13 counties in 2012); they have been able to hold ground in several rural counties that used to be a key base of national Democratic support decades earlier.  However, Democrats also find themselves losing offices in counties like Pinellas, Hillsborough, and Osceola; counties where they normally win in Presidential and Gubernatorial contests.

Look at the Presidential results in Florida below, and keep the results in mind as we go through the partisan control of the constitutional officers.


Only a few counties elect candidates on a non-partisan ballot (more on that later).  For anyone elected on a non-partisan ballot, I used their party registration.  Any official designated as NPA is either registered as an independent or ran on a partisan ballot as NPA.

Lets start looking at each office.   First up is Tax Collector.


Tax Collector is the only one of these six offices that is majority held by Democrats.  Democrats control a large number of the rural counties in addition to their standard Democratic base.  These are especially prominent in the panhandle where Democrats are still majority in registration.  However, they still lose in the Tampa Bay area that President Obama won.  A note, the Pasco Tax collector was a Democrat but passed away and a Republican, Mike Fasano, was chosen to replace him.  At the beginning of 2013 Democrats control 37 of these offices.


Republicans just narrowly edge out Democrats for this office.  Democrats still dominate in the panhandle but control fewer rural counties in the central and southern part of the state.  In addition, Democrats fail to capture Pinellas or Orange county.


Democrats continue to dominate in the panhandle but are weaker further south.  For property appraiser the also lose Miami-Dade in and Palm Beach counties in addition to other Obama counties.


Supervisor of Elections shows less of a pattern than other offices.  Democrats largely win in the Obama counties in addition to winning many rural counties in the central and southern part of the state despite being less dominant in the panhandle that with other offices.


The office of Sheriff has more elected to it as NPA than any other.  Several of these candidates are/were Democrats who decided to avoid primaries.


Democrats and Republicans nearly split the superintendent offices right down the middle  Most parts of the country do not elect superintendents, and indeed 26 counties in the state have chosen to have that position appointed by the school board rather than elected.  Most of the areas that elect superintends are rural counties.  Leon considered moving to appointment but rejected it in a local referendum several times over the last three and a half decades.

Looking at these six maps there are clear patterns.  Democrats do well in the panhandle region of the state (but get cut off further west) and enjoy support in the rural counties in the middle of the southern edge of the state.  These rural counties have been ancestrally Democratic for generations but rarely vote for the national or state-level party that they perceive as too liberal.  These local offices are all that remain of a once reliably Democratic base in the state.   Meanwhile Democrats do well in the metropolitan southeast counties (notably Miami-Dade elects very few of these officers) and in the Orlando area.  Democrats, however, do not control all the offices in counties that President Obama won in 2012 (and control none in Pinellas).  Republicans, meanwhile, do well in the suburban string of counties and other rural counties that make up their base of support.

The map below shows the overall balance of power between the two parties among the constitutional officers that they elect.

Constitutional Officers

Democratic control is heavily concentrated in the panhandle counties in the north and includes a mix of rural and urban counties moving down the state.  Calhoun county is notable for being split between Democrats and NPA’s who beat official Democratic candidates.  Republicans dominate in the western edge of the panhandle and dominate in the suburban counties of the upper-east coast and all of the west coast.  Overall, Democrats control 28 of the 67 counties, which is way more than the 13 President Obama (who only won two rural counties), carried.   Republicans, boosted by their strengths in the suburban and rural regions, control the a majority of officers in 34 counties.

Notice that some counties are indicated as not electing constitutional officers on partisan ballots.  In Columbia, none are, while the rest use a mix (some are and some are not).

Referencing back to my previous post on the county commissions, I want to examine one more thing.  First, you can see the map of county commission control below.

County Commissions

More details can be found in the article itself.  However, you can certainly see a pattern of Democratic support in the rural counties in the north and south/central parts of the state.  Democrats actually perform worse in some of their Obama-supporting counties (not controlling Orange, Osceola, Miami-Dade, and others) and in some rural counties.  With constitutional officers, Democrats have managed to hold onto rural counties that they lost the county commissions of and held onto top-down urban Democratic counties that they are still working to take control of at the county commission level.

Just by looking at the last two maps you can see a general correlation between party control for county commissions and constitutional officers.   I decided to look at that further.  I examined all the counties that elect their commissioners AT-LARGE (same as constitutional officers) and looked to see which parties controlled a majority of both institutions. The results are below.


Many of the Democratic panhandle counties have elections in single-member districts and hence were not examined,  Among the 40 counties that elect their commissions at-large, 31 have a majority of their county commissions and constitutional officers controlled by the same party.  Republican counties make up a majority of these counties.  There are 6 counties where Democrats control the constitutional officers but not the commissions (all except Osceola are rural counties where the commission loses have been in recent years).  The results from the 40 counties show a strong correlation between control of one institution and another.

So what can be concluded by this analysis?  Democrats win statewide thanks to support in large metropolitan counties.  However, the party still has a local base of support in the rural panhandle and farming counties in the south.   Democrats could try and use those local bases of support to push for greater party unity higher up on the ballot (especially by running these local officials for state legislative or congressional office).  The party must also be wearing of losing ground with these offices, similar to ground lose in rural county commissions in recent elections.  As local elections become nationalized it will be tougher for Democrats to hold these offices.  The future of these local officials will say a great deal about the direction of the party in those areas for decades to come.